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I. INTRODUCTION 
To lusty cheers of consulting economists and litigating 
lawyers everywhere, and the heartfelt groans of everyone 
responsible for litigation budgets at pharmaceutical companies, 
the Supreme Court in FTC v. Actavis, Inc.1 rejected both (a) the 
settling parties’ view that any settlement within the scope of 
the patent at issue and not the result of sham litigation was 
legal;2 and (b) the FTC’s view that any settlement which 
involved a transfer of any money or asset from the patent 
owner to the challenger was presumptively illegal.3 The Court 
chose to open up door (c), and require that there be a full “rule 
of reason” inquiry into the settlement.4 Those who were afraid 
that the Court might actually settle the law here can breathe 
easily again. 
In the underlying litigation, Solvay settled infringement 
suits with would-be generic producers with a settlement which 
let the generics enter on a date certain (before the expiration of 
the patent at issue), and with payments to the alleged infringer 
in exchange for the performance of certain marketing and 
promotional services for Solvay.5 The FTC alleged that these 
services had little value and that the payments were really 
made to compensate the generics for agreeing to delay their 
entry into the market.6 
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 1. FTC v. Actavis, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2223 (2013). 
 2. Id. at 2237. 
 3. Id. 
 4. Id. at 2237–38. 
 5. Id. at 2229. 
 6. Id. at 2229–30. 
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The district court dismissed the FTC’s complaint under the 
“scope of the patent” test, and the Eleventh Circuit affirmed, 
holding that “absent sham litigation or fraud in obtaining the 
patent, a reverse payment settlement is immune from antitrust 
attack so long as its anticompetitive effects fall within the 
scope of the exclusionary potential of the patent.”7 
Some ninety-five percent of all patent cases are resolved by 
settlement before a court judgment.8 Settlements are not only 
permitted, but favored. There is not, and rationally cannot be, 
any requirement that every case needs to be litigated to the 
death. Only someone who has either never litigated, or never 
worried about a litigation budget, would suggest a “no 
settlements” rule. The question comes down to what limits, if 
any, the law imposes on the parties’ freedom to settle the cases. 
And does the fact that cases arose under the provisions of the 
Hatch-Waxman Act9 make any difference? 
The Supreme Court had essentially four possible ways to 
deal with these issues: 
A. The Scope of the Patent Test: This was the majority 
rule, which held that if the settlement was within the scope of 
the patent and the litigation was not sham, the decision of the 
parties as to the terms of settlement would be respected.10 This 
is the rule applied to patent cases in general, and the question 
was whether it should also apply in the somewhat weird world 
of Hatch-Waxman (more on this below). 
B. The Presumptive Illegality Test: This was the FTC’s 
approach, and a slight retreat from its initial position. To the 
                                                          
 7. FTC v. Watson Pharm., Inc., 677 F.3d 1298, 1312 (11th Cir. 2012), 
rev’d sub nom. FTC v. Actavis, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2223 (2013). 
 8. Marc G. Schildkraut, Patent-Splitting Settlements and the Reverse 
Payment Fallacy, 71 ANTITRUST L.J. 1033, 1048 (2004). 
 9. Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration (Hatch-
Waxman) Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-417, 98 Stat. 1585 (codified as amended 
in scattered sections of 15, 21, 28, and 35 U.S.C.). While the statute is usually 
cited as encouraging generic drugs, it also attempted to help restore the 
patent life lost in the regulatory review process. See H.R. REP. No. 98-857, 
pt. 1, at 15 (1984) (describing how Title II of the Act incentivized research and 
development through “restoration of some of the time lost on patent life while 
the product is awaiting pre-market approval”). The intent was to provide 
something for the generics and something for the innovators. That second part 
tends to be overlooked. 
 10. Actavis, 133 S. Ct. at 2239 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (“[T]he patent 
holder—when doing anything, including settling—must act within the scope of 
the patent.”). 
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FTC, a settlement is legal if the patent owner gives up one kind 
of property (part of his patent term), but presumptively illegal 
if he gives up some other kind of property (such as a cash 
payment). The original formulation of the test was that any 
payment or transfer of value of any kind (other than giving up 
part of the patent tem) was not merely presumptively, but per 
se illegal (and the FTC urged Congress to so legislate).11 But 
before the Court in Actavis, the FTC scaled back to requesting 
only that the settlement be presumed to be illegal and that the 
parties could try to justify it12—to the same agency that had 
publicly announced many times that such settlements were all 
illegal. 
C. The Rule of Reason Test: The full, untrammeled rule of 
reason inquiry: whether, on balance, the pro-competitive 
aspects of the transaction outweigh the anticompetitive 
aspects.13 As this is the test that the Court adopted, we will 
speak about it in more depth below. 
D. Let Congress Fix What Congress Hath Wrought: This 
argument is really quite simple. What prompted the whole 
situation of odd-looking settlements was the structure that 
Congress set up in the Hatch-Waxman Act. Under that statute, 
a generic company can take a patented drug, create its own 
version, and do the bioequivalence testing necessary to get it 
approved, all without being deemed to have infringed the 
innovator’s patent.14 
                                                          
 11. For example, in the 109th, 110th, 111th, and 112th Congresses, 
Senator Herb Kohl (together with between four and nine co-sponsors from 
both parties) introduced the Preserve Access to Affordable Generics Act. S. 27, 
112th Cong. (2011); S. 369, 111th Cong. (2009); S. 316, 110th Cong. (2007); S. 
3582, 109th Cong. (2006). The proposed bills would have made it unlawful for 
a brand-name manufacturer and a generic ANDA filer to enter into any 
agreement where “(i) an ANDA filer receives anything of value,” and “(ii) the 
ANDA filer agrees not to research, develop, manufacture, market, or sell the 
ANDA product for any period of time.” E.g., S. 27, 112th Cong. § 3(a) (2011). 
None of the proposed bills passed. 
 12. Actavis, 133 S. Ct. at 2237. 
 13. See, e.g., Cal. Dental Ass’n v. FTC, 526 U.S. 756, 779–80 (1999) 
(“‘[W]hether the ultimate finding is the product of a presumption or actual 
market analysis, the essential inquiry remains the same—whether or not the 
challenged restraint enhances competition.’” (quoting Nat’l Collegiate Athletic 
Ass’n v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 85, 104 n.26 (1984))). 
 14. See 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(1) (2006 & Supp. V 2011) (providing that uses 
of patented inventions “reasonably related to development and submission of 
information under a Federal Law” related to manufacture and sale of 
pharmaceuticals are not acts of infringement). 
126 MINN. J. L. SCI. & TECH. [Vol. 15:1 
 
Hatch-Waxman set up an artificial act of infringement 
(Paragraph IV filing);15 essentially a no-risk way for a generic 
to provoke a challenge, putting the patent at issue. As Courts 
and commentators have pointed out at length, this skewed the 
risk/reward calculus for the parties: The infringer (generic) has 
no downside (litigation costs only),16 and a huge potential 
upside (it may gain the entire product market—first to file, 180 
day exclusivity, and mandatory generic substitution).17 The 
innovator has no upside (the best that it can do is preserve 
what it has—there are no damages to compromise as a 
settlement), and a huge potential downside (lose the whole 
product market). And as courts and commentators have 
repeatedly recognized, patent litigation is always a risk—there 
is a real chance of losing your patent even when you should 
win.18 
That means that a generic company with a weak or non-
existent case still has an enormous incentive to “infringe” by 
making the filing. The unique position that ANDA filers have 
in Hatch-Waxman litigation encourages Paragraph IV 
certifications, and persistent litigation, even where the generic 
has little reason to be confident regarding its prospects on the 
merits.19 
Given that Congress set up this weird mix of incentives 
and disincentives, and given that what is at issue here is the 
balance between rewarding innovation and encouraging 
generic entry to lower prices, and given that this is an area in 
which Congress has chosen to legislate, then why not leave it 
up to Congress to fix the mess that it created? 
                                                          
 15. 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(2)(A)(vii)(IV) (2012). 
 16. Kelly Smith & Jonathan Gleklen, Generic Drugmakers Will Challenge 
Patents Even When They Have a 97% Chance of Losing: The FTC Report that 
K-Dur Ignored, 9 CPI ANTITRUST CHRON., Sept. 2012, at 6, available at 
https://www.competitionpolicyinternational.com/file/view/6746 (“[T]aking a 
shot at a patent is, if not costless, quite cheap. The only costs of a challenge 
are litigation expenses and the cost of regulatory approval.”). 
 17. In re Tamixofen Citrate Antitrust Litig., 429 F.3d 370, 391 (2d Cir. 
2005) (“The incentive . . . may be immense: the profits [a generic] will likely 
garner in competing with the patent holder . . . and . . . possible entitlement to 
a 180-day period . . . during which it would be the exclusive seller of the 
generic drug in the market.”). 
 18. See, e.g., Kent S. Bernard & Willard K. Tom, Antitrust Treatment of 
Pharmaceutical Patent Settlements: The Need for Context and Fidelity to First 
Principles, 15 FED. CIR. B.J. 617, 627–28 (2005). 
 19. See generally Smith & Gleklen, supra note 16. 
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II. WHAT THE COURT’S DECISION IN ACTAVIS 
ACTUALLY DID 
We will hear a lot of spinning about who “won” this case, 
and indeed both sides can claim the laurel. The FTC “won” 
because it gets to bring these challenges. The manufacturers 
“won” because the FTC will have to prove a full rule of reason 
case without any presumption that payments are illegal. 
So let’s look at the decision itself. The majority opinion, 
authored by Justice Breyer, held that antitrust challenges to 
reverse payment settlement agreements should be analyzed 
under the rule of reason.20 The Court recognized that the “scope 
of the patent” test was grounded on a strong policy 
consideration favoring settlements, and that the rule of reason 
would likely reduce the litigating parties’ incentive to settle 
patent infringement suits, but agreed with the FTC that “there 
is reason for concern” that reverse payment settlements “have 
significant adverse effects on competition,” and that the “scope 
of the patent” test therefore did not subject such agreements to 
a sufficient amount of antitrust scrutiny.21 
However, the Court also rejected the FTC’s argument that 
reverse payment agreements are presumptively unlawful.22 
Since the dissent also rejected the FTC’s argument, one of the 
less publicized results of the case is that the “presumption of 
illegality” which the FTC has been pushing was rejected by all 
the Justices participating in the case. 
In making its determination, the Court specifically pointed 
to “five sets of considerations,”23 which it summarized as 
follows: 
[A] reverse payment, where large and unjustified, can bring with it 
the risk of significant anticompetitive effects; one who makes such a 
payment may be unable to explain and to justify it; such a firm or 
individual may well possess market power derived from the patent; 
a court, by examining the size of the payment, may well be able to 
assess its likely anticompetitive effects along with its potential 
justifications without litigating the validity of the patent; and 
parties may well find ways to settle patent disputes without the use 
of reverse payments.24 
                                                          
 20. FTC v. Actavis, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2223, 2237 (2013). 
 21. Id. at 2231. 
 22. Id. at 2237–38. 
 23. Id. at 2234–37. 
 24. Id. at 2237 (emphasis added). 
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Like many majority opinions, this one seems to reflect 
compromises and comments necessary to get the majority vote. 
Statements that reverse payment settlements in which there 
are no actual damages are unusual outside the pharmaceutical 
field are disingenuous. 
First, we don’t know about most settlements. No law 
requires them to be filed with the FTC or made public except in 
the Hatch-Waxman drug field.25 Second, cases outside of the 
Hatch-Waxman universe are indeed sometimes settled with a 
combination of payments and cross-licenses, the net result of 
which may be a payment to the alleged infringer (when all the 
valuations are done).26 Third, in no field of which the author is 
aware, other than Hatch-Waxman cases, do you have a 
situation where the norm is that the infringement has not 
caused any actual damages at the time of trial. The artificial 
trigger of infringement is unique to Hatch-Waxman. Given the 
oddity of the statute, some oddities in the settlements could be 
foreseen. 
The majority opinion raises some fascinating questions: 
 A. What kinds of settlements are now permissible? The 
Court states that it is permissible to negotiate a date certain 
for generic entry prior to the patent’s expiration.27 It also states 
that cash payments to a generic company may be justified 
under certain limited circumstances, such as to compensate for 
litigation costs.28 And it is legal to pay fair value for services or 
products from the potential infringer.29 
B. What kinds of settlements are now at risk? The Court 
repeatedly emphasizes that “[a]n unexplained large reverse 
payment itself” suggests that the patentee has doubts about 
the patent’s strength and survival.30 As the dissent points out, 
this is vastly over-simplified. Even someone very confident 
about their patent knows that litigation is a risk, and for 
someone risk-averse, the payment may be worthwhile to avoid 
                                                          
 25. See C. Scott Hemphill, An Aggregate Approach to Antitrust: Using 
New Data and Rulemaking to Preserve Drug Competition, 109 COLUM. L. REV. 
629, 641 (2009) (raising the factual question of how frequently these 
settlements occur). 
 26. Id. (“[H]ow do we know that the payment was made in exchange for 
delay, rather than for some other valuable consideration?”). 
 27. Actavis, 133 S. Ct. at 2234. 
 28. Id. at 2235. 
 29. Id. 
 30. Id. at 2236. 
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the risk of an erroneous lower court finding against the patent, 
even if that finding was likely to be reversed on appeal.31 This 
raises three basic questions: 
(1) How do we determine what is a “large” payment? The 
Court indicates merely that the scale of reverse payments 
should be weighed against the brand’s anticipated litigation 
costs, the value of any services provided by the generic, and 
other justifications raised by the defendants.32 But are these 
the only factors? A reverse payment of $1 million may seem 
large in the context of a product that sells $10 million per year. 
But in the context of a $1 billion product, it would not seem 
large at all. 
(2) Do we really care if the patentee has “doubts” about the 
strength or survival of the patent, or is this a shorthand way of 
saying that such a large and unexplained payment suggests 
that the patent actually is invalid or not infringed? If the latter, 
that shorthand argument runs smack up against the facts of 
some of the most famous litigated cases. In the Cipro 
litigation,33 Bayer settled the first case with Barr; then 
Ranbaxy, Schein, Mylan, and Carlsbad each challenged the 
Cipro patent. In each case, Bayer produced the record of the 
Barr case. Bayer won all the subsequent cases.34 The reverse 
payment certainly did not reflect a weakness in the patent! 
(3) What explanations will serve to justify an otherwise 
“large” reverse payment? The Court states that the payment 
may be an estimate of saved litigation expenses, or “may reflect 
compensation for other services that the generic has promised 
to perform—such as distributing the patented item or helping 
to develop a market for that item.”35 
                                                          
 31. Id. at 2244–45 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting); see also Bernard & Tom, 
supra note 18, at 626–27, 622–23. The importance of allowing settlement to 
protect against unjustified theft of the innovator’s intellectual property as the 
result of an erroneous trial court decision seems to be ignored here. 
 32. Actavis, 133 S. Ct. at 2236. 
 33. In re Ciprofloxacin Hydrochloride Antitrust Litig., 544 F.3d 1323, 
1328–29 (Fed. Cir. 2008). 
 34. Ranbaxy withdrew its certification and abandoned the litigation. In 
the Schein and Mylan cases, Bayer won on summary judgment and the Court 
of Appeals for the Federal Circuit affirmed. Carlsbad’s challenge to the patent 
was rejected in a bench trial, and it did not appeal. I want to thank counsel for 
Bayer for providing me with this information. See also In re Ciprofloxacin, 544 
F.3d at 1329. 
 35. Actavis, 133 S. Ct. at 2236. 
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C. Does Actavis require an inquiry into the strength of the 
patent at issue in evaluating a settlement? The Court 
recognized that if parties were forced to litigate the validity of 
the underlying patent to defend against antitrust challenges to 
patent settlement agreements, the incentive to settle would be 
significantly diminished.36 The Court claimed, however, that 
[I]t is normally not necessary to litigate patent validity to answer the 
antitrust question . . . . An unexplained large reverse payment itself 
would normally suggest that the patentee has serious doubts about 
the patent’s survival. And that fact, in turn, suggests that the 
payment’s objective is to maintain supra-competitive prices to be 
shared among the patentee and the challenger rather than face what 
might have been a competitive market—the very anticompetitive 
consequence that underlies the claim of antitrust unlawfulness.37 
What is meant by that “normally” is not clear. Does it 
mean that sometimes an “unexplained large reverse payment” 
does not suggest anything bad and is not illegal? Or does it 
mean that even if there is no payment, there can still be a 
violation? If the latter is true, then no settlement on any terms 
is safe from attack. One would hope that was not the Court’s 
intent.  
III. DID THE COURT SLAY A BRONTOSAURUS? 
Both the majority and the dissent in Actavis focus on 
settlements involving cash payments from the patentee to the 
alleged infringer. The only problem is that such cash payments 
have become less and less common (even when they were held 
to be perfectly legal). 
Scott Hemphill has done extensive research as to the facts 
of the reverse payment cases, and the results are instructive.38 
Since 2005, the clear trend in the cases has been away from 
cash payments entirely. The settlements are being based on 
side deals, the kinds of “other services” that the Court in 
Actavis says may justify the “payment.”39 So, if cash deals are 
out of fashion, how do we evaluate whether or not there has 
been that “unexplained large reverse payment” that triggers 
scrutiny? 
                                                          
 36. Id. at 2234, 2237. 
 37. Id. at 2236 (emphasis added). 
 38. See Hemphill, supra note 25, at 657–61. Even those of us who disagree 
with Scott’s conclusions and prescriptions owe him a debt of thanks for his 
work in obtaining and laying out the underlying data. 
 39. See id. at 649 tbl.2; see also id. at 663–65. 
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IV. QUO VADIS? 
First, when we evaluate a settlement involving services or 
products provided by the alleged infringer, the question cannot 
rationally be whether the parties would have done the deal 
absent the litigation. Such a test would eviscerate the Court’s 
opinion as to legitimacy of fair value deals. If the parties had 
wanted to deal with each other apart from the litigation 
settlement context, they would have. This is simply another 
facet of the Court’s finding that if the transaction is for fair 
value, then it should be allowed without regard to the pendency 
of the patent infringement case. 
In our context, the question has to be: “Notwithstanding 
the litigation, does this deal represent a fair value transaction 
for both parties?” So, how do we determine fair value? Enter 
the economists and consultants. Businesses value products and 
services every day, and those values should be the starting 
point for looking at a settlement. But since the parties know 
that the FTC and a veritable swarm of plaintiff’s lawyers will 
be picking the deal apart, having the imprimatur of experts 
with a lot of initials after their names becomes a wise 
investment. 
Second, as we have noted earlier, any settlement 
agreement involves some sort of consideration to the 
defendant—whether in the form of foregone damages, express 
monetary payment, or other benefit. Settlement, after all, is a 
compromise—not total surrender. So does the Court’s adoption 
of a rule of reason test in Actavis, broadly read, mean that 
agreements entailing any consideration—short of an agreement 
that simply allows the generic to enter before the underlying 
patent expires—must be defended by showing that the value of 
the consideration does not include a premium to the generic to 
stay out of the market? That would be to resurrect the 
presumption of illegality, which the Court decisively rejected. 
No rational company provides services without making a profit. 
Since there is no presumption of illegality, the burden is on the 
challenger to show that there is a premium and that such 
premium is not simply a fair profit in the transaction. 
Finally, there is one really interesting potential train 
wreck that seems to have been overlooked in the initial 
analyses. The unexplained large payment (bad) and the fair 
value for services (good), are rational individually, but a mess 
when put together. 
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A payment with no explanation invites argument that it 
was for some malign purpose; here delayed generic entry. 
Conversely, a payment that can be fully explained as 
compensating the generic for real services (say, distributing 
product) almost has to be legal. The alternative would be to 
hold that once patent litigation is filed, the two parties cannot 
do ordinary business together, which would be ludicrous. 
This leads to the conundrum that the Court has left us. If 
the business deal between the patentee and the potential 
infringer is large enough, even if entirely defensible at fair 
value, the profit on the side deal could be enough to convince 
the generic to agree to a later entry date. But there is no 
“payment” for delay at all. 
Yet if you condemn a legitimate side deal simply because it 
can generate legitimate business profits for the generic, there is 
no stopping point, and all settlements that are anything other 
than partial surrender by the patentee are illegal. Not even the 
FTC argued that, being content to argue that a reverse 
payment created a presumption of illegality, a position that the 
Court unanimously rejected in Actavis.40 
V. A RADICAL, YET CONSERVATIVE CLOSING THOUGHT 
The Court’s decision raises many interesting topics for 
later discussion. But let’s step back a bit first. Much of the 
debate over reverse payment settlements in Hatch-Waxman 
cases has simply assumed the inherent rightness of the current 
statutory structure, specifically the 180 days of generic 
exclusivity to the first filer. It has been an argument about 
what should happen at the back end, when the patent cases 
brought under the statute settle. But what if, instead of trying 
to regulate the downstream outcomes, we look to change the 
upstream motivations and pressures? 
At the time the statute was passed, it was assumed that 
the first filer would litigate its case to conclusion. But that 
overlooked the fact that almost all patent cases settle. The 
                                                          
 40. The dissent would have upheld the “scope of the patent” test. Actavis, 
133 S. Ct. at 2238 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting). The majority ordered a full “rule 
of reason” inquiry. Id. (majority opinion). There were no votes for the 
presumption of illegality that the FTC sought. And if you cannot rely on “fair 
value of deal” as a complete defense, we are then thrown back on strength of 
the patent, which the Court did not want to get into and, one might say, 
implicitly rejected as unworkable. See id. at 2234. 
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intent of the 180-day exclusivity was to encourage challenges to 
patents and to knock out weak patents. In fact, what it has 
done is encourage a lot of patent challenges, even when the 
challenger has almost no chance of winning.41 The structure 
incentivizes long-shot challenges in the hopes of being bought-
off in settlement.42 
The 180-day exclusivity is worth a lot more today than it 
was when Hatch-Waxman was passed. In 1984, generic 
substitution was permissible. Now it is mandatory in almost all 
cases.43 So why don’t we make the first filer earn that reward 
by either pursuing the case to conclusion or settling in a way 
that does not block later filers? Scott Hemphill and Mark 
Lemley have provided an elegant analysis for making just such 
a change.44 As radical as it might seem at first glance, this is 
really a very conservative approach. Rather than trying to 
regulate how litigation is settled, it moves to the cause of what 
troubles critics of the settlements.45 
With all due respect to the consultants and litigators, this 
may just be the way out of the swamp. If you shut off the water 
flow at the entrance, you don’t need to keep trying to build 
dams to regulate the exit. 
 
                                                          
 41. See Smith & Gleklen, supra note 16, at 6. 
 42. Id. 
 43. Bernard & Tom, supra note 18, at 624. There is always an exception 
for a doctor to indicate that the branded product should be dispensed, but the 
extra time and effort involved, and the added cost to the patient, makes this a 
relatively insignificant part of the market. Id. (citing a Novartis study 
showing that generic substitution rates were between 83.8% for 
commercial/group plans and 97.1% for Medicaid plans). 
 44. C. Scott Hemphill & Mark A. Lemley, Earning Exclusivity: Generic 
Drug Incentives and the Hatch-Waxman Act, 77 ANTITRUST L.J. 947, 985–88 
(2011). We do not agree with all of their prescriptions and arguments, but we 
do believe that the approach could work in the real world. 
 45. Following up on Hemphill and Lemley, there is also a need for 
research into the actual business models of some generics companies. The 
assumptions about generic drug company behavior that underlie many of the 
arguments in the Hatch-Waxman settlement field may well be factually 
incorrect. For example, Johnson & Johnson has been involved in patent 
litigation for some time over a low dose oral contraceptive, Ortho Tri-Cyclen 
Lo. After the first challenger launched at risk (which served to trigger the 180-
day exclusivity for the first filer) and was enjoined (which eliminated the 
exclusivity entirely), Johnson & Johnson still had to defeat seven more 
challengers to the patent. Since exclusivity was not involved, what did prompt 
these serial challenges? I am indebted to counsel at Johnson & Johnson for the 
information on this litigation. 
  
*** 
